Public debt and shifting of the debt burden from one generation to the next. Further considerations: do outright monetary transactions (OMT) comply with the EU Treaty? by Hennies, Manfred O.E. & Raudjärv, Matti
  15
PUBLIC DEBT AND SHIFTING OF THE DEBT BURDEN FROM ONE 
GENERATION TO THE NEXT  
 
Further considerations:  
do outright monetary transactions (OMT) comply with the EU Treaty? 
 
In connection with the immensely increasing public debt both within the European 
Union and in other leading industrial countries of the world, reproaches are made 
again  and  again  that  this  constitutes  also  an  increasing  burden  for  the  future 
generations of the population of these countries. Such generalisations are wrong, 
however. Objective treatment of this problem requires differentiated consideration. 
We should keep public debt owed to domestic creditors (internal public debt) strictly 
separate  from  that  owed  to  foreign  creditors  (international  public  debt)  in  these 
countries regardless of whether the creditors are natural or legal persons.
1  
 
If  the  creditors  of  the  public  debt  are  domestic  creditors,  the  domestic  financial 
assets are increasing. If the population holds public bonds, it becomes the creditor 
for the state, i.e. the creditor for itself. Summa summarum such financial transactions 
do not change the financial situation of the national economy. Public debt is set off 
by the equivalent fictitious financial assets held by domestic investors. „The people 
on the whole do not become richer if the financial capital is grown through the 
acquisition of public bonds, and vice versa – they  do not become poorer if  this 
increases the public debt as this is another aspect of the same process.“
2 
 
How to assess the situation which will develop years later when the state will have 
to repay the debts? Will redemption of the public debt create an additional burden 
for the generation who will have the obligation to repay it? 
 
Let us assume that the state will not be able to finance repayment of the debt from 
the current state revenues in the future. Then the state will have to raise taxes to be 
able to repay its debts. The citizens of the state will then indeed have to bear the 
burden of additional taxes. But who will benefit from the repayments in such a 
situation?  Surely,  the  same  generation  which  is  burdened  with  additional  taxes! 
                                                                  
1 The concepts internal public debt ↔ international public debt have to be kept separate from 
the pair of concepts implicit ↔ explicit national debt. The following thoughts are based on the 
actual deficit expressly stated in the state budget. Implicit public debt, on the other hand, is just 
forecasted deficit which has not become a reality yet but may arise on the basis of effective 
legislation (in connection with the disbursement of pensions of government officials, social 
benefits,  e.g.  pension  insurance,  health  care  benefits,  long-term  care  benefits  and  other 
payments  guaranteed  by  the  state),  in  connection  with  expected  demographic  changes 
(population, age structure) and considering the development of public revenues. Thus the social 
benefits and the required additional state expenditures will increase and also changes will be 
made  in  their  financing  (increasing  of  social  benefits and/or taxes,  explicit national  debt), 
which will concern only the next generations and will not lead to the immediate shifting of the 
debt burden in that sense. 
2 D o n n e r ,  O . ,  G r e n z e n  d e r  S t a a t s v e r s c h u l d u n g .  W e l t w i rtschaftliches Archiv,  Volume  56,  2 
(1942), pp 183 et seq.   16
„Money is actually moved only from one pocket to another“
3. All in all, in the case 
of domestic debt – apart from the possible impact on economic growth meanwhile – 
ceteris paribus (all other things being equal), the total amount of money available to 
the population will not change in any way. 
 
The description presented above certainly does not exclude any severe impact of 
changes  in  the  redistribution  system  of  the  private s e c t o r  w h i c h  c o n c e r n  m a n y  
people.  This  will  happen  if  the  economic  agents  who a c t u a l l y  h a v e  t o  b e a r  t h e  
additional tax burden are not the same persons to whom the public bonds will be 
repayed.
4 T h e  p u r c h a s i n g  p o w e r  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y  a s  a  whole  will  not 
decrease, however. Thus us we can state the following: shifting of the debt burden 
from one generation to the next will not depend on the existence of the public debt 
to the extent that public bonds are acquired by domestic economic agents. The same 
applies to the payment of interest by the state to holders of bonds.  
 
The situation may be different if public debt is acquired by foreign buyers. Now the 
debt repayment and interest obligations will be to payees who are abroad. If such 
payments cannot be made in due time from current public revenues, the taxes will 
have to be raised. Such a trend may decrease the potential living standards of the 
particular generation of taxpayers.  
 
To what extent it will actually happen in mid-term or long-term will depend on the 
purposes for which the state uses its purchase power achieved with the assistance of 
debts. If it is predominantly used for consumption purposes, e.g. for current public 
expenditures
5 and purchasing of arms, it will really burden the future generations 
without giving them any benefit.  
 
On the other hand, if expenditures financed with public debt are used above all for 
projects intended for the future, such as infrastructure expenditures in the broadest 
sense
6,  such  expenditures  will  increase  the  growth  potential  of  the  national 
economy.  If  it  will  lead  to  future  economic  growth, i t  w i l l  b e n e f i t  t h e  f u t u r e  
generations. Consequently, such use of funds will shift the debt burden from one 
generation to the next only if the subsequent absolutely necessary increase of the tax 
burden is perceived higher than the increase in welfare achieved on the basis of the 
economic growth. 
 
With the outburst of the debt crisis within the European Union, the European Central 
Bank (ECP) first started to buy Greek bonds from the after-market from May 2010 
through outright monetary transactions (OMT), then also Irish and Portuguese bonds 
and from August 2011 in addition also Italian and Spanish bonds. By February 2012 
                                                                  
3 Idem, p. 185. 
4 Think about the clearly decreasing impact of value-added taxes, particularly concerning food 
products. 
5 For instance, on salaries, state pensions, pensions not covered by contributions. 
6 S u c h  a s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o n  e d u c a t i o n ,  s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e arch  and  development  activities, 
communication equipment, road construction.   17
the total volume of these bonds had increased to 219.5 billion euros.
7 The objective 
of  this  novel  measure  was  to  assist  the  countries  in  trouble  for  the  moment  to 
decrease  their  financing  costs.
8 F r o m  t h e  a s p e c t s  o f  „ t h e  g e n e r a t i o n “  o f  s i n g l e  
countries, the European Central Bank should be viewed as a foreign institution. In 
that respect the statements provided above apply. 
 
As  to  outright  monetary  transactions,  their  closer  review  raises  the  question  of 
whether  the  described  activities  of  the  ECP  are  still  included  in  its  mandate. 
According  to  Article  123  of  the  EU  Treaty,  any  favouring of Member States in 
providing loans is expressly prohibited to the ECP. This means that the Central Bank 
is not allowed to provide directly any ECP credit facilities to EU Member States. 
Otherwise there is the risk that the inflation potential that would develop in the 
course of time may become unmanageable. Besides, such financing opportunities 
would  make  it  possible  to  exert  pressure  on  governments  to  perform  structural 
reforms in the areas of industrialisation, infrastructure and labour market, and there 
would be no pressure to decrease the accumulated debts. 
 
It is worth finding out whether Article 123 of the EU Treaty prohibits the European 
Central Bank to buy also bonds already issued. In addition it would be necessary to 
find  out  whether  this  prohibition  applies  also  to  the  bonds  of  countries  which 
comply with the conditions of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
9. 
 
An important question should be asked, bearing in mind the ultimate duty of any 
central bank: are the economic difficulties of the countries in crisis, which the ECP 
makes efforts to fight by way of outright monetary transactions, signs of disorders in 
monetary  policy  transmission,  or  are  these  economic p r o b l e m s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
fundamental  structural  problems  of  these  countries? I n  o t h e r  w o r d s :  i s  t h e  E C P  
trying  to  paralyse  disorders  in  the  interactions  in t h e  c h a i n  o f  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  
instruments
10 b y  b u y i n g  a l r e a d y  i s s u e d  b o n d s  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  or  at  least 
maintain the efficiency of the measures, or is the Central Bank indirectly financing 
the countries with its outright monetary transactions, ignoring Article 123 of the EU 
Treaty? 
 
                                                                  
7 Source: EZB 
8 It is questionable whether ECP will achieve this also after 2013 and 2014, after the Chairman 
of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System declared the imminent end to 
the current low-interest policy, although only in case of positive developments of the economic 
and employment growth in the U.S.A. And more: „The duties of the Central Bank do not 
include blocking higher risk premiums.“ (Jürgen Stark (Economist of the ECP from June 2006 
to  September 2011) –  a quote  from  his interview  to  the  German  newspaper  Handelsblatt, 
26.07.2013, p. 24 et seq.) 
9 According to this reform programme (Secondary Market Support Facility, briefly SMSF), 
ESM makes it possible to buy government bonds in the after-market and namely in unlimited 
amounts. 
10 Measures of monetary policy → instrument variable (monetary base = amount of funds of 
the Central Bank) → target variable (interest rate) → ultimate goal (price level stability)   18
At any rate, the purchasing activities of the ECP – and this should be understood – 
are accompanied by unforeseeable common risks. The fact that the dramatic increase 
in the amount of funds of the ECP due to outright monetary transactions during the 
first round of purchases has had as yet no impact on inflation does not prove that 
ECP was indeed only trying to eliminate problems from the interactions of monetary 
policy. ECP performs its outright monetary transactions (OMT) „in the gray zone 
somewhere between monetary and fiscal policies.“
11 Where does monetary policy 
end and fiscal policy begin? These issues are currently subjects of heated disputes 
and controversies. There is no general answer for them and also courts cannot decide 
them.
12 Answers can in principle be found only in a specific situation and by taking 
into account specific macroeconomical framework conditions. 
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11 Clemens Fuest (Centre for European Economic Research) before the Constitutional Court of 
Germany in Karlsruhe on 11 June 2013. 
12 It would actually make no sense to present this issue to the Constitutional Court of Germany 
for  adjudication  as  this  court  is  not  competent  to  give  instructions  to  the  ECP.  Only  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  in  Luxembourg  could  issue a  j u d g m e n t  i n  t h i s  i s s u e  a n d  o n l y  
provided that the judges and their consultants have the required technical knowledge.  